Insurance risk pooling, loss coverage and social welfare: When is adverse selection not adverse? by Tapadar, Pradip
Insurance Risk Pooling, Loss Coverage and
Social Welfare








If insurers cannot charge risk-differentiated premiums, then:
higher risks buy more insurance, lower risks buy less insurance,
raising the pooled price of insurance,
lowering the demand for insurance,
usually portrayed as a bad outcome, both for insurers and for society.
In practice:
Policymakers often see merit in restricting insurance risk classification
EU ban on using gender in insurance underwriting.
Moratoria on the use of genetic test results in underwriting.
Question:
How can we reconcile theory with practice?
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Introduction Motivating example
Motivation: Two risk-groups µL = 0.01 and µH = 0.04
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Why do people buy insurance?
What drives demand for insurance?
How much of population losses is compensated by insurance?
Which regime is most beneficial to society?
Definition (Loss coverage)
Expected population losses compensated by insurance.
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Why do people buy insurance? Assumptions
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Why do people buy insurance? Assumptions
Why do people buy insurance?
Assumptions
Consider an individual with
an initial wealth W,
exposed to the risk of loss L,
with probability µ,
utility of wealth U(w), with U′(w) > 0 and U′′(w) < 0,
an opportunity to insure at premium rate pi.
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Why do people buy insurance? Expected utility: Without insurance
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Why do people buy insurance? Expected utility: With insurance
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Why do people buy insurance? Maximum premium tolerated
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What drives demand for insurance? Modelling demand for insurance
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What drives demand for insurance? Modelling demand for insurance
Modelling demand for insurance
Simplest model:
If everybody has exactly the same W, L, µ and U(·), then:
All will buy insurance if pi < pic.
None will buy insurance if pi > pic.
Reality: Not all will buy insurance even at fair premium. Why?
Heterogeneity:
Even if individuals are homogeneous in terms of underlying risk,
they can still be heterogeneous in terms of risk-aversion.
Source of Randomness:
An individual’s utility function: Uγ(w), where parameter γ is drawn from
random variable Γ with distribution function FΓ(γ).
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What drives demand for insurance? Insurance demand
Insurance demand
Standardisation
As certainty equivalent is invariant to positive affine transformations, we
assume Uγ(W) = 1 and Uγ(W − L) = 0 for all γ.
Condition for buying insurance:
Given a premium pi, an individual will buy insurance if:
Uγ (W − piL)︸ ︷︷ ︸
With insurance
> (1− µ)Uγ(W) + µUγ(W − L) = (1− µ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Without insurance
.
Demand as a function of premium:
Given a premium pi, insurance demand, d(pi), is:
d(pi) = P [UΓ (W − piL) > 1− µ] .
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What drives demand for insurance? Insurance demand
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What drives demand for insurance? Iso-elastic demand
Iso-elastic demand
Constant demand elasticity














1Assumptions: W = L = 1, Uγ(w) = wγ and Γ has the following distribution function:
FΓ(γ) = P [Γ ≤ γ] =

0 if γ < 0
τ γλ if 0 ≤ γ ≤ (1/τ)1/λ
1 if γ > (1/τ)1/λ.
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What drives demand for insurance? Iso-elastic demand
Iso-elastic demand
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How much of population losses is compensated by insurance? Risk classification
Risk classification
Risk-groups
Suppose a population can be divided into 2 risk-groups where:
risk of losses: µ1 < µ2;
population proportions: p1, p2;






, i = 1, 2;
fair-premium demand: τi = di(µi) for i = 1, 2.
Assume W = L = 1 and constant demand elasticity λ for all risk-groups.
Note: The framework can be generalised for n > 2 risk-groups.
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How much of population losses is compensated by insurance? Market equilibrium
Market equilibrium and loss coverage
For a randomly chosen individual, define:
Q = I [ Individual is insured ] ;
X = I [ Individual incurs a loss ] ;
Π = Premium offered to the individual.
Expected premium, claim and market equilibrium
Expected premium: E[QΠ] = p1 d1(pi1) pi1 + p2 d1(pi2) pi2.
Expected claim: E[QX] = p1 d1(pi1) µ1 + p2 d1(pi2) µ2.
Market equilibrium: E[QΠ] = E[QX].
Loss coverage (Population losses compensated by insurance)
Loss coverage: E[QX].
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How much of population losses is compensated by insurance? Risk-differentiated premium
Scenario 1: Risk-differentiated premium
Market equilibrium
If risk-differentiated premiums are allowed,
Equilibrium is achieved when pi1 = µ1 and pi2 = µ2.
No losses for insurers.
No (actuarial/economic) adverse selection.
Loss coverage (Population losses compensated by insurance)
E[QX] = p1 d1(µ1) µ1 + p2 d1(µ2) µ2,
= p1 τ1 µ1 + p2 τ2 µ2.
P Tapadar (University of Kent) Insurance loss coverage and social welfare March, 2019 20 / 31
How much of population losses is compensated by insurance? Pooled premium
Scenario 2: Pooled premium
Market equilibrium
If risk-classification is banned, under iso-elastic demand pooled premium is:
pi0 =
p1 τ1 µλ+11 + p2 τ2 µ
λ+1
2




No losses for insurers! ⇒ No (actuarial) adverse selection.
Loss coverage (Population losses compensated by insurance)
E[QX] = p1 d1(pi0) µ1 + p2 d1(pi0) µ2.
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How much of population losses is compensated by insurance? Pooled premium





















Pooled equilibrium is greater than average premium charged under full risk
classification: pi0 > α1µ1 + α2µ2 ⇒ (Economic) adverse selection.
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How much of population losses is compensated by insurance? Pooled premium



















Aggregate demand (cover) is lower than under full risk classification⇒
(Economic) adverse selection.
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Loss coverage under pooled premium
Loss coverage under risk-differentiated premium
,
=
p1 d1(pi0) µ1 + p2 d1(pi0) µ2
p1 τ1 µ1 + p2 τ2 µ2
.
Comparison of risk-classification regimes
C > 1⇒ Risk pooling is better than full risk classification.
C < 1⇒ Risk pooling is worse than full risk classification.
P Tapadar (University of Kent) Insurance loss coverage and social welfare March, 2019 24 / 31















λ < 1⇔ C > 1⇒ Risk pooling is better than full risk classification.
λ > 1⇔ C < 1⇒ Risk pooling is worse than full risk classification.
Empirical evidence suggests λ < 1 in many insurance markets.
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Which regime is most beneficial to society? Social welfare
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Which regime is most beneficial to society? Social welfare
Social welfare
Definition (Social welfare)
Social welfare, S, is the expected utility for the whole population:
S = E
[
QUΓ(W −ΠL)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Insured population








Loss coverage + Constant.
Result
Maximising loss coverage maximises social welfare.
λ < 1⇒ Risk pooling is better than full risk classification.
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Which regime is most beneficial to society? Social welfare
Motivation: Two risk-groups µL = 0.01 and µH = 0.04
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Conclusions
Conclusions
Adverse selection need not always be adverse.
Restricting risk classification increases loss coverage if λ < 1.
Maximising loss coverage maximises social welfare.
Restricting risk classification increases social welfare if λ < 1.
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Conclusions
Reference: Loss coverage blog
https://blogs.kent.ac.uk/loss-coverage/
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